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Walmart’s Sustainability Journey: 
Andy Ruben and the Design of Organizational Structures and Systems (B) 
 
In October 2007, Andy Ruben gazed over the expanse of blue cubicles at the Walmart corporate 
offices, reflecting on the strategic structures and systems he had established to meet the 
company’s ambitious sustainability goals—100% renewable energy, zero waste, and the sale of 
sustainable products—set by CEO Lee Scott in a landmark speech in October 2005. Only months 
before that speech, Scott had tapped him to become Walmart’s first Vice-President for 
Sustainability, cementing the sustainability leadership that Ruben had shown in the year of 
exploration leading up to the speech. Now, in line with a Walmart philosophy that stated that the 
top management team should learn all parts of the business, Ruben would soon take on a new job 
as Vice President, Sourcing and Operations, for Walmart’s private brands. He would be handing 
over the sustainability reins to a successor, Matt Kistler. After two years in this position, Ruben 
had a unique opportunity to reflect on what he had done. Had he taken the right approach to 
bring about the change that Lee Scott wanted? 
 
As he considered this question, he realized that his most lasting legacy would be the 
decentralized approach he had taken to developing the company’s sustainability strategy. First, 
he had formed 14 Sustainable Value Networks (SVNs), charged with seeking new sustainability 
opportunities across the wide range of Walmart’s products and operations. Second, he had 
explicitly included multiple external stakeholders in the network structure to ensure that new 
people, ideas, and approaches could interact with Walmart’s existing expertise in seeking out 
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new directions and opportunities. Third, instead of building a large corporate office that led and 
controlled sustainability initiatives, he had deliberately developed a small sustainability office 
charged with forming and supervising the SVN and engaging in other efforts to spread 
sustainability throughout the organization. This decentralized organizational structure fit with 
Walmart’s view of sustainability as an opportunity for the organization to discover, through trial 
and experimentation, what a company of its size and power could achieve. 
Sustainable Value Networks 
The 14 SVNs that Ruben organized revolved around the three aspirational goals: waste, energy, 
and products (see Exhibit 1). In designing the networks, Ruben placed responsibility at the same 
sites where capabilities were present to implement change: ―We were intentional to organize 
around how the business was organized, which was merchandizing units as opposed to back-end 
technologies and capability.‖i The 14 networks corresponded as much as possible to existing 
business units, especially as they corresponded to broader sustainability goals. Thus, to address 
the challenge of 100% waste, the networks pertained to operations, management, and packaging. 
To address the challenge of renewable energy, separate SVNs focused on alternative fuels, 
buildings, logistics, and greenhouse gasses. For sustainable products, the networks included food 
and agriculture, electronics, chemical-intensive products, textiles, seafood, jewelry, forest 
products, and China. But these networks were not designed to be silos; they were to be malleable 
and interconnected, enabling them to address the full range of the company’s footprint: upstream 
in the supply chain, internal in operations, and downstream to the consumer. 
 
Each value network consisted of cross-functional teams, led by an executive sponsor and a 
network captain, the latter usually selected from among Walmart senior management in the 
relevant area. The members also included representatives from external groups, such as 
suppliers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), consultants, federal and state agencies, 
universities, trade associations, and third-party verification providers. (See Exhibit 2.) 
Sometimes the collaboration even extended to competitors, especially if their participation might 
help push a technology to scale. 
 
The SVNs also were charged with developing quick wins with short-term paybacks, intermediate 
projects designed for two- to three-year paybacks, and game changers that demanded long-term 
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investments of time and resources (initially, the goal was at least six quick wins, two innovation 
projects, and one game changer). The networks developed many stories of quick wins, which 
could be quickly communicated to the other networks and throughout the organizations. For 
example,  
 Innovations in plastics recycling—the ―sandwich bale‖—saved $3.5 million in 2007 and 
diverted 1,100 tons of plastic from landfills. 
 The sale of 100 million compact fluorescent bulbs saved customers $3 billion in energy 
costs and reduced CO2 emissions by 25 million metric tons. 
 LED lighting in refrigerator cases was expected to save $2.6 million/year and reduce 
CO2 emissions by 35 million pounds/year.
ii
 
These stories of successes, and many others, were shared widely across the company, including 
in frequent meetings with the CEO and the senior leadership team. (See Exhibit 3 for a longer list 
of sustainability milestones at the time.) Ruben actively worked to ensure that early successes 
were highly publicized, because  
Every time we told a story publicly we were not only recognizing and celebrating 
an individual, we were also showing what was possible, allowing each person 
hearing the story to consider what they could be doing.  
 
The shared stories created a sense of traction and social purpose; perhaps most important, they 
also demonstrated quick business results. 
 
While stories of quick wins built momentum and commitment throughout the company, Ruben 
still believed that the long-term payback would come from mobilizing the networks to 
restructure the industries in which they operated through game-changing innovations: 
As an organizing principle, when we introduced the networks, we talked about 
their role to shift the businesses that we’re in. We were very intentional about 
that. So, although the back-end work between agriculture and food and cotton and 
textiles is very similar, we were very intentional to have separate networks for 
textiles and food and agriculture; because we wanted to, actually, evolve how the 
business worked. And we wanted the role of the network to be able to convene 
and to transition its own industry. 
While the networks were an innovative approach for creating project visibility and ―safe‖ sites 
for experimentation, Ruben hoped they would evolve into hubs for radical innovation that could 
have major impacts on Walmart’s environmental impact and bottom line. 
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Sustainability 360 
Learning from its quick wins and the power of engaging constituents in innovating for 
sustainability, Walmart announced its Sustainability 360 in February 2007 (Exhibit 4). This 
program aimed to articulate and expand Ruben’s inclusive strategy, engaging employees, 
suppliers, NGOs, and communities in sustainability efforts that would extend beyond the work 
being done within the SVNs. For example, Ruben helped develop the concept of personal 
sustainability projects (PSPs), designed to encourage Walmart employees to identify an area of 
their life or community that was not sustainable and develop a plan to fix it by making small 
changes to their everyday habits. The program was piloted in 2006 and formally announced in 
April 2007. By September 2007, 248,000 U.S. associates reported having a PSP, with outcomes 
that included, for example, recycling of almost 1 million pounds of aluminum, glass, paper, and 
plastic. Other projects included healthy meals, quitting smoking, and exercising. Some widely 
shared PSPs gained visibility on the company website, an effort to further reinforce the notion 
that everyone should be participate in Walmart’s sustainability programs.iii  
 
Ruben also sought to extend sustainability mindsets throughout the organization by facilitating 
more than 20 ―eat what you cook‖ sustainability trips for executives, removing them from the 
comfort of the boardroom and allowing them to experience firsthand the impact of 
environmental degradation. Ruben believed that these field trips created visceral experiences that 
gained traction in a world of financial analysis within the corporation: 
Each trip was centered around a top Walmart Executive and designed based on 
their personality, interest and role in the company. We asked each executive to 
invite their top 3-4 people in their organizations which further identified leaders 
and engaged them in the journey. A big secondary benefit was the stories that 
followed from these 1 night trips. For instance, Mike Duke went to the Arctic 
Circle, Lee Scott went to visit with Maple Sugar Farmers and then stayed 
overnight at Mt Washington Observation Center, and Doug McMillon went to the 
largest landfill in NY.  
 
These trips, and the stories they evoked, became part of broader efforts to build commitment to 
sustainability efforts throughout the organization.  
 
The concept of partnering was also central to the networks and Sustainability 360. These 
partnerships might include supply chain relations, though increasingly, they featured outside 
constituencies that Walmart had previously resisted or ignored. Ruben and the networks instead 
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began inviting these groups to the table. For example, the environmental collective Carbon 
Disclosure Project had long pressured the retailer to collect greenhouse gas emissions data; now 
Walmart agreed to engage with the group.
iv
 The rationale was that radical changes to the 
business model would not happen without the kind of pressure and knowledge provided by these 
sources. (See Exhibit 5 for examples of the kinds of projects undertaken with NGOs and 
universities, originating from both within and outside of the networks.) Partnering with external 
stakeholders was critical for Ruben, who regarded them as instrumental for infusing new 
thinking and bringing new capabilities into the company, and its supply chain, without the 
benefits of a large corporate office for sustainability: 
My whole framework was resourcing. I remember talking with people from the 
Environmental Defense Fund. We just kept pushing on ways to tap into their 
resources. My big plan was that I’d get EDF to open an office in Northwest 
Arkansas. The second they would do that, I would take it to the National 
Resources Defense Council. I would get NRDC to open an office in Arkansas. 
Then I would take it to 15 more NGOs. And my whole thought was, I’ve only got 
a small number of people, so I’ve got to figure out a model that’s going to allow 
us to be successful. 
The Sustainability Office 
Ruben deliberately chose to develop a relatively small corporate sustainability group. He 
believed strongly that innovation needed to emerge from within the organization if it was to 
produce long-term results; therefore, Ruben hoped to embed responsibility for sustainability 
within the business units of the organization, rather than assign it to a strong central office. To 
enable this diffusion, he hired a small team to support the business units in their search for 
sustainability: 
We organized it, eventually, like a strategy team. First we hired Janelle Kearsley 
whose job was to think about incentives and alignment. Janelle worked on setting 
up the SVNs, alignment of pay structures and incentives, the eat-what-you-cooks, 
milestone meetings, and PSP. Then we hired Tyler Elm who was, essentially, in 
charge of the building blocks of the strategy—managing the SVNs. And the third 
member of a strategy team Harriet Hentges who was in charge of stakeholder 
relationships. Through these relationships we would find the leading edge of 
research—what was going on in the world.  
Ruben referred to Walmart’s efforts as a sustainability strategy precisely because the goal was to 
embed its implementation into the everyday strategic activities of the organization as a whole: 
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Business isn’t done in the strategy group; business is done in the business units. 
The strategy group is a very small group. There’s no power there, right? The 
power of sustainability was that it was being done in the organization.  
Although individual networks and business units might implement many different types of 
initiatives, the job of the central office was to design central coordination and communication to 
allow new ideas to emerge from within the business units.  
Looking Forward 
Considering the company’s reputation for innovation and rapid change capabilities, Ruben was 
not surprised that Walmart had identified an opportunity in sustainability and moved quickly. It 
has already made significant progress in energy and waste, though a systematic strategy for 
products was lagging. Because most of the impact of the company lay in its supply chain, a 
comprehensive strategy for defining and measuring sustainable products would be a significant 
challenge for his successor. Another challenge was finding ways to maintain the culture of 
experimentation and trial that defined the early period of innovation within the SVNs. He knew 
that as the program grew bigger and achieved more attention, there would be growing pressure 
for central coordination and control of activities through the sustainability office. But in Ruben’s 
mind, the broad goal to use a sustainability lens to transform the business in which Walmart 
competed could be accomplished only if sustainability became firmly embedded throughout the 
organization as a whole. 
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Exhibit 1: Sustainable Value Networks 
 
Source: Walmart Slide excerpted from presentation shown to merchants April 2007, courtesy of 
Walmart 
 
Exhibit 2: SVN Membership 
 
Source: Walmart Slide excerpted from presentation shown to merchants April 2007, courtesy of 
Walmart 
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Exhibit 3: Pages 6–8 from Walmart’s Sustainability Progress to Date 2007-2008 report 
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Exhibit 4: Sustainability 360 
 
Source: Walmart Slide excerpted from M. Anderson, presentation to Sustainable, Responsible, Impact 
Investing Conference, October 2008 
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Exhibit 5: Sample Partnerships with NGOs and Universities 
Goals SVN NGO/University Partnerships and Activities 
100% 
Renewable 
Energy 
 
Global 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): Reverse growth curve for 
greenhouse gas emissions; improve energy efficiency in stores 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP): Help suppliers manage 
greenhouse gas emissions; reduce Walmart’s total carbon footprint 
Alternative 
Fuels 
EDF: Increase truck fleet fuel efficiency; improve packaging 
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI): Hybrid diesel–electric 
trucks to improve fuel efficiency 
Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI): Explore new technologies, 
including LEDs and solar power 
Global 
Logistics 
RMI: Sustainability in jobs, products, and processes; monitor 
environmental processes of suppliers; assist suppliers with process 
innovation; oversee chain of custody for eco-labeled products; improve 
logistics program 
Buildings 
RMI: Cut energy use in stores; decrease heating and cooling 
costs  
CCI: Efficient building materials and LED lighting 
EDF: Sensor-activated, low flow faucets to reduce water flow 
by 80% 
Zero 
Waste 
 
Waste EDF: Reduce plastic shopping bag waste 
Packaging 
EDF: Reduce, reuse, and recycle plans; create educational 
materials for customers  
CDP: Measure energy to create products throughout supply 
chain  
Sustainable 
Products 
 
Chemical 
Intensive 
Products 
EDF: Introduce chemical safety standards for suppliers; reduce toxic 
components in products  
Electronics 
Green Electronics Council (GEC): Improve environmental 
and social performance of electronic products; develop 
scorecard  
Food, 
Agriculture, 
Seafood 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC): Certification of 
fisheries that meet environmental standards 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF): Help boat operators prepare 
for certification; increase fisheries and processing plants with 
MSC certification 
Mercy Corps & USAID: Improve lives of small-scale 
farmers in Guatemala 
Transfair: Supply fair trade–certified coffees 
Forest & 
Paper 
WWF (Global Forest Trade Network): Use responsible forestry; phase 
out illegal and unwanted wood sources; use wood products from 
certified sources 
Jewelry 
Conservation International (CI) and Initiative for Responsible 
Mining Assurance: Jewelry with documented chain of custody; 
diamonds, gold, and silver will come from mines demonstrating 
environmental and social leadership 
China EDF: Greening the China supply chain 
Textiles 
Organic Cotton Exchange: Purchase cotton from farmers who use 
organic methods; support t-shirts made from transitional cotton (and 
farmers that make the transition to the organic process) 
Source: Compiled by authors from press accounts and other public sources 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 Unless otherwise indicated, all quoted material from Andy Ruben came from personal interviews on July 6, 2011, 
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ii
 Walmart, 2008 Sustainability Progress to Date 2007–2008, 
http://www.walmartstores.com/sites/sustainabilityreport/2007/companyPerformance.html. 
iii
 Sacks, D. 2007. Working with the enemy, September 1, Fast Company. Available at: 
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iv
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